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Abstract: Since the early 1960s, Cuba and the United States have been mutually iso-
lated in terms of political, diplomatic, and economic relations, and the growing Cuban 
community in the U.S. has maintained limited contact with the island:~ population, 
especially due to the U.S. embargo against Cuba and to the political contradictions 
betiveen Cuba's government and the Cuban elite in Miami. There is, nevertheless, a 
growing transnational space of, especially, "common Cubans." This article discusses 
Cuban transnational space from different perspectives, including histo1y, economy, 
and politics, and it is argued that newer migration waves and economic reforms have 
contributed to the creation of such space. Furthermore, if this dynamic continues, 
such a space can become an important factor in the current transformation process 
that Cuba is undergoing, confirming in this way a historical tradition: since the 19'1' 
century, i.e . before independence, all major transformation processes in Cuba have 
included an important transnational dimension. 
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Introduction 
Currently, Cuba is engaged in a process of profound social , economic, 
and-possibly-political changes aimed at reforming and restructuring the 
country's social and economic system. In the discursive self-representation 
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by the Cuban authorities as well as in academic and journalistic analyses, 
this process is mostly discussed as an autonomous national phenomenon in 
which the transnational context-including the basic fact of an impo1tant 
Cuban community outside the country- is not seen as a fundamental factor. 
Analyses of social processes in Cuba and in the Cuban communities out-
side the island are often seen as separate, rather than interrelated questions. 
There has been, thus, a tendency to disregard the transnational dimension, 
which-as will be argued in this article- has played a stronger and more 
permanent role in Cuba's evolution than is often acknowledged, also during 
the last 50 years. 
A main reason for this tendency in the academic and media analyses of 
Cuba is, undoubtedly, that the political contradictions between Cuba and 
the U.S. (and to some extent other Western countries) , as well as between 
the island and the exile communities, have been taken as ontological pre-
mises for an analysis rather than a political and discursive construction that 
in itself could be an object of study. The fact that the Cuban emigration has 
been considered politically rather than economically motivated has been 
seen-to some point correctly-as a basic factor impeding the creation of 
a transnational space similar to other Caribbean and Latin American com-
munities. It is obvious that actual political, economic, and other formal-
ized relations between the island and the exile communities have been very 
limited since the early 60s, but it is also a fact that the very existence of 
the external communities has been a constant and fundamental factor for 
Cuba's political, economic, and cultural development. Furthermore, impor-
tant changes in the character of the Cuban emigration to the U.S. and other 
countries have taken place since 1980, and these changes have been playing 
a growing role in the creation of a transnational space in a broad sense of 
the word including economic, political, and cultural aspects. 
This transnational aspect of Cuban society has, however, been increas-
ingly acknowledged in the more recent literature where a more explicit 
interest in the study of transnational aspects of different Cuban phenomena 
has been manifest. Examples are the studies of Mahler and Hansing (2005), 
Perera Pintado (2005), and Blue (2004). Also the works of Eckstein (e.g. 
2004) and Barberia (2004) are part of this current. On the other hand, works 
like Perez (1998 and 1999) show how transnational economic and cultural 
spaces between Cuba and the U.S. existed long before the massive emigra-
tion of exiled Cubans to Florida in the 60s and 70s and even before the U.S. 
intervention in the Cuban-Hispanic conflict in 1898. This type of work is 
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important in order to give a broader understanding of a history of transna-
tional relations that is both longer and more complex than often acknowl-
edged by a historiography that tends to focus on the 201h century, or more 
specifically on one period from 1898 to 1959, and another from 1959 and 
on. The fi rst would correspond to a period of tight relations between Cuba 
and the U.S ., and the second to the revolutionary period and the conflicts 
between the two countries . Although such premises are no doubt very rele-
vant, they also seem to be- at least implicitly- influenced by a Cold War 
perspective and/or a nationalist-revolutionary perspective, both of which 
tend to stress political conflicts in the U.S.-Cuban and Cuban transnational 
relations. 
Therefore, a broader discussion of different aspects of Cuban transna-
tional contexts , including history, politics, economy, and culture, is still 
needed. This article will build on the works mentioned and others, and it 
will discuss the importance of the transnational dimension, including first 
and foremost the Cuban-U .S. relations and the relations between the emigre 
community and the island . Such a discussion should not, however, be 
limited to the most visible types of transnational relations- like migration, 
traveling, remittances, cultural exchange , etc. - but include more implicit 
and less visible elements of the configuration of transnational space, such 
as the (socially) imagined space, the mental inclusion (or exclusion) of the 
"other," as well as the effect that the existence of a transnational space can 
have on political discourse , culture, and informal economy. 
A basic fact in this discussion is that 1.6 million Cubans and Cuban-
Americans live in the U.S .1 (see also Perez 2006, Eckstein and Barberia 
2002). Compared to the island's population of about 11.4 millions, this 
number is of considerable importance. A majority of the 1.6 million were 
born outside the U.S. (i.e. in Cuba), namely around 979,000 (ibid). The 
high concentration of the Cuban diaspora is another important factor. Apart 
from the more than a million and a half of Cuban origin residing in the U.S., 
the second most important destination for Cuban emigrants is Spain with 
a little less than 100,000 Cubans, whereas most other receiving countries 
have rather small numbers of residing Cubans. The question of concentra-
tion is also of a regional importance: of the 1 .6 million Cubans or Cuban-
Americans, more than 1.1 million live in Florida, and mainly in Miami, 
I According to the Pew Hispanic Center: http://pewhispanic.org/fi les/factsheets/60.pdf 
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especially Dade County. This means that a number corresponding to around 
ten per cent of the island's population is concentrated in an urban area in 
the neighboring U .S., only around 200 miles from Havana.2 Miami is thus 
the second Cuban urban area in size, and an important part of its (Cuban) 
population possesses considerable economic and political resources and 
power. The particular political circumstances and relations between the 
"two Cubas," i.e. the island and the U.S.-based community, indeed play a 
major role as a modifying element, but these relations are also subject to 
important changes. Hence, the transnational dimension is fundamental in 
order to understand not only current but also future dynamics of both Cuba 
and Miami. 
In this article it shall be argued how and why some important processes 
and changes in Cuba, both historically and in the current reform process, 
are somehow linked to a transnational context. I will also argue that the de-
velopment and existence of a transnational space between "the two Cubas" 
have bearings on the perspectives on and possibilities for the current re-
form process in Cuba. In order to do so I will discuss the following as-
pects: first, the dominant, "national-revolutionary" political discourse in 
Cuba and its transnational and dichotomic character, taking into account 
the historical background; secondly, the different emigration waves from 
Cuba to the U.S., especially after 1959, and their importance for the crea-
tion of a transnational space; thirdly, I will focus on some of the Cuban 
government's economic strategies, in particular the openings toward a more 
market-oriented economy, and it is my hypothesis that the general legaliza-
tion of the dollar and other convertible currencies in the 90's was especially 
important in this sense, as will certainly be the current process of privatiza-
tion of the labor force; finally, I will relate these questions to the dynamics 
of the social imaginary in Cuba and in the exile, characterized, according 
to my hypothesis , by tendencies of de-politicization, which, again , would 
augment the potential for the creation of a transnational space. The aim of 
this multi-faceted focus is to pursue the general hypothesis of the complex 
and often non-acknowledged character of the transnational dimension and 
its importance for the understanding of Cuba's socio-economic processes. 
It is important to stress that a contemporary and historical, as well as a 
2 The sho11est distance between Florida and Cuba is about 90 miles, a number very often used in Cuban 
political and popular discourse as a measure of the threat (or promise) constituted by the close U.S . pres-
ence. 
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multi-faceted view on these problems is necessary in order to argue for the 
importance of the transnational understanding as a broader perspective on 
Cuban social phenomena. 
The layout of the article is as follows: first a brief introduction to the 
main theoretical concepts and the methodology used, which is followed by 
a run-through of the historical background in order to show the importance 
of the transnational context for political and other social processes in Cuba. 
I then discuss the question of Cuban revolutionary nationalism as well as 
the implicit (and explicit) transnational character of this nationalism , in-
cluding the question of dichotomic discourse and the lack of a third space. 
The subsequent section contains an analysis of the impact that later migra-
tion waves had on the creation of a transnational space , and this analysis is · 
followed by a discussion about the economic changes in the 90s and how 
they made for a transnational economic space. The question of the politi-
cization and de-politicization of the social imaginary and the private space 
is the theme of the next section, followed by a discussion of the current 
reform process under Raul Castro . In the conclusions, I will try to synthe-
size these various perspectives in order to return to my starting point: the 
importance of a fmt her analysis of the transnational dimension of Cuban 
social processes. 
Theoretical Concepts and Methodological Apprnaches 
A main theoretical concept to be used is obviously "transnational(ism) ," 
according to, among others, Levitt (2001) and Levitt and Schiller (2004). In 
Levitt's work, as in this article, migration is an important aspect of the con-
cept, both theoretically an<l in lht: empirical approach. But I will also use 
the concept in a broader sense in order to include phenomena not directly 
related to migration, such as political discourse, cultural and mental spaces, 
and "social imaginary." For transnationalism also implies the idea of "space" 
(Lefebvre 1991 , Hall 1966). Following Low and Lawrence-Zuniga (2003), 
the notion of "transnational spaces" can be studied in three dimensions, i.e. 
global spaces, transnational spaces, and translocal spaces. The notion of 
space will also be used in a broader sense that includes imagined, mental, 
and cultural spaces like, for instance, the space of economic transactions or 
the imagined constitution of a Cuban identity. 
A more specific idea of space used in this article is the notion of " third 
space"-and particularly its absence- which I use as my starting point for 
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studying Cuban political discourses and identity constitutions (see also 
Gustafsson, in print). The concept will be further discussed below (in the 
section "The Two Cubas and the Question of a Third Space"), but it relates 
mainly to the discursive dichotomy of political and identity discourses ac-
cording to which there are two-and only two-antagonistic Cuban iden-
tities, both politically defined as for or against the national-revolutionary 
regime. The fact that the dominant political and identity discourses in both 
Cuba and the exile community have taken this for granted has resulted in a 
lack of solid political alternatives and a lack of a "third space" for the con-
struction of identities and discourses . 
1\vo other central theoretical concepts are "discourse ," inspired mainly by 
Laclau (2005) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985), and "social imaginary," origi-
nally coined by Castoriadis (1998). For reasons of space, I will not engage 
in further discussions of the former. The latter, "social imaginary," has been 
used in some European traditions, and has been (and still is) quite popular in 
Latin American social and human sciences. Although it has a certain simil-
arity with notions like "mentality," "discourse," and "habitus," it cannot be 
completely identified with any of these. It stresses the importance of a men-
tal and symbolic constitution of the social world besides its more physical 
manifestations. This mental-symbolic world, i.e. the "imaginary," is not in-
dependent from the rest and is closely entangled with economic and political 
structures, discourses, etc., in a complex relation of causes and effects. 
The interdisciplinary use of different empirical and theoretical perspec-
tives implies likewise a certain variety of methodological approaches and 
empirical sources, including media texts, political discourse, film, and li-
terature , as well as interviews and conversations held in Cuba, November 
2006, and Miami , February 2008. Earlier visits to Miami (1986 and 1993) 
as well as a four-year period of residence in Cuba (in the mid-eighties) 
constitute the general background for my studies of Cuba and the Cuban 
community of Florida. 
Cuban Transnational Traditions-a Brief Historical Comment3 
The Cuban nation is, as any postcolonial nation, transnational in its very 
constitution. The economic, political, and cultural foundation of Cuba is 
3 This paragraph is based, among others, on: Perez, 1998 and 1999, Skidmore 2005 , and Staten 2003 . 
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related to the Spanish conquest and colonization of the territory, whose in-
sular geography and relative cultural unity contributed to creating the basis 
for a nation during the 19u' century. Nationalist movements and rebellions, 
including two wars, took place during the second half of the 19th century, 
but the country did not obtain its independence until 1902, after a process 
of conflicts , wars, and political and diplomatic efforts in which the U.S. 
played a central role. The Cuban nationalist movement started the second 
war of independence against Spain in 1895, and in 1898 the U .S . inte rvened 
by declaring war against Spain-the Spanish-American war (a term not 
recognized by Cuban historiography), which the U.S. won after a short pe-
riod of fighting. In this way, the process of Cuba's independence is doubly 
transnational: against the colonial power, Spain, and with the help of-but 
also against-the new (and to some, neocolonial) power, the United States 
of America. It is important to acknowledge the complexity of the Cuban-
U .S. transnational relation and to avoid simplified historiographies, accord-
ing to which the U.S . acted either as a pure liberating force or as a simple 
neocolonial power with selfish interests. There can be no doubt that the 
U.S. had strong economic and political interests in Cuba already during the 
colonial period, and that the relations between Cuba and the U.S . from 1898 
to 1959 can be characterized as a relation of interdependence. But the eco-
nomic, cultural, and political relations between the two countries were very 
complex during most of the 20th century and even earlier. Before obtaining 
formal independence, Cuba was an American protectorate until 1902, and 
the U.S . secured the right to the naval base of Guantanamo as a condition 
for the independence. Until the Revolution of 1959, Cuban politics and 
economy depended basically on the U .S. On the other hand, members of 
the Cuban nationalist and revolutionary movements of the late 191h century, 
including the national hero Jose Marti ( 1853-95), took exile in the U.S . and 
organized activities from there. Therefore, the period from the 1890s to the 
early 20th century constitutes an important first part of a long and complex 
transnational relation , in which the U.S. both appears as a self-interested 
superpower that can be seen as an impediment for real Cuban independence 
and becomes the space that relates to exile and important changes. 
While the period from around 1900 to 1959 is characterized by intense 
relations of economic and political dependence, as well as important cul-
tural exchange, the latest and most important moment of transnational rela-
tions between Cuba and the U.S. begins after the national-popular revolu-
tion of 1959. As mentioned, the massive emigration of Cubans to the U.S . 
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during the 60s and 70s created the basjs for actual Cuban communities in 
the USA, especially in southern Florida and New Jersey, with Miami as 
the most important 'Cuban' city of the United States , and the second most 
populated 'Cuban' city after Havana. The character of this community dif-
fered from most other Latino communities due to the middle and upper 
class origin of a majority of its members, as well as the preferential treat-
ment they received as a consequence of their migration status. 
This brief outline of transnational Cuban relations emphasizing the 201h 
century and the political relations should not, however, make us forget the 
very basic fact that there exists, as mentioned above, a much broader and 
more complex web of economic, cultural, and other kinds of transnational 
relations between Cuba and the U.S. beginning already by the mid 1911i 
century and continuing into the 201h- and now 21'1-century (Perez 1999). 
Small and big business, individuals , and organizations of Cubans in New 
York, New Jersey, Florida, and other places, as well as of Americans in 
Cuba, have contributed to a history of transnational relations that goes 
far beyond what the more general historiography tends to focus upon. So 
do exchange and relations of popular culture-Cuban music has played 
a major role in the U.S. during a great part of the 201h century, baseball 
rapidly became Cuba's national sport and even more important than in the 
U.S ., relatively speakjng at least. All this points to a complexity of transna-
tional relations and spaces that goes far beyond the idea of a little country 
defending its identity against an empire or the Cold War-inspired notions 
of Cuban-U.S. confrontations as essentially being a question of the West 
versus communism. 
The Two Cubas and the Question of a Third Space 
The notion of "third space" as a sort of presence-absence in Cuban political 
discourse and identity constructions , and in a more general sense in other 
social fields, is , in my opinion, a useful instrument for the understanding of 
both negative and positive factors influencing the creation of a transnational 
space. Third space and transnational space are not totally synonymous, 
though they partly overlap. The notion of third space covers any symbol-
ic, economic, discursive, or other social space (in the broader sense of the 
term) that constitutes an "in-between" between the "two Cubas" (Gustafs-
son , in print). The term "two Cubas" refers to the existence and construc-
tion of ideologically, politically, economically, and symbolically separated 
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Cuban spaces, and any space, discourse, or project that constitutes itself as 
a third option or as an in-between (including transnational phenomena) will 
function as a "third space." It is therefore relevant to discuss the problem 
of the " two Cubas" and a third space, on the one hand as a factor working 
against the evolution of transnational spaces and, on the other, as a factor 
that is doomed to change if the development of economic, cultural, and 
symbolic transnational spaces continues . 
The Cuban socio-economic model of today maintains a se1ies of elements 
from a Soviet-inspired economic model and contains economic and politi-
cal elements that can be considered obsolete. Raul Castro's current reform 
process is aimed at creating a much more dynamic economic model without 
abandoning, however, the fundamentally nationalist revolutionary ideology.' 
Any analysis of Cuban politics and economy based mainly on the assump-
tion of the system as a "communist left-over" will face difficulty when it 
comes to identifying the factors which have assured the survival of a system 
so often deemed on the verge of collapse, especially in periods of crisis, 
such as the early 60s, the early 90s, and after Fidel Castro's illness from 
2006. In this context, the importance of nationalism and national popular 
discourse (Rojas 2006; Gustafsson, under publication) must be taken into 
consideration as a central, although not the only, explanatory model. 
What is interesting in relation to the question of Cuban transnationalism 
is that nationali sm becomes both an important source for and result of trans-
national elements in the Cuban social processes. A first argument is mainly 
theoretical: nationali sm is in its essence transnational, as the nation must 
be defined and identified in contrast and in relation to others (Jenkins 1996, 
Wodak et al 1999) . But such identifications are, obviously, also empirical in 
nature , and in the case of Cuba the country's history has shaped a particular 
nationalism in which the neighboring U.S . is the indisputable "significant 
other" (Jenkins 1997), toward which Cuba and Cubans define themselves. 
If we look at the official discourse since 1959, and particularly since 1961 
after the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs by counterrevolutionary ex-
ile Cubans supported by the U.S. , it is evident that the national identity is 
constructed against a U.S . seen as hostile and imperialist, and as the basic 
enemy of the Cuban people and the Cuban Revolution. 
Nevertheless, the transnational dimension of Cuban identity and society 
relates not only to the U.S., but also to the transnational constitution of 
Cuban society as such. As indicated above , the Cuban and Cuban-Ameri-
can population outside Cuba totals more than 1.6 million, of which many 
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are economically a lot better off than most of their fellow countrymen 
living on the island. Traditionally, a considerable part of this community 
and in particular the elite constituted by the first migration waves (Eckstein 
and Barberia 2002) is influenced by strong anti-communist and anti-
Castro discourses and practices, and tend to see themselves as the inversed 
reflection of Castro's revolutionary discourse , contributing in this way to 
the constitution of the "two Cubas." This radical political division be-
tween the government of Havana and the exile community elite, as well 
as the Cuban emigration policies and the U.S . embargo, all contributed to 
the establishment of two very different and separated Cuban communi-
ties-one in Cuba and the other in the U.S.-rather than to a transnational 
space of continuous and multiple relations . To leave Cuba and settle in the 
U.S. or elsewhere was - and to some extent still is-for most people a 
radical decision that could mean a permanent separation from family, 
friends, and home as well as giving up the right to maintain Cuban citizen-
ship. 
In the dominant discourses , the two Cubas became each other's "other," 
the part of the nation considered the nation's enemy, and with which a dia-
logue, or even contact, was almost impossible. Any Cuban could be with 
one or the other, but not with both, nor in-between. There were , and to some 
point remain, two spaces with no third and no common space. 
Just how radical this division was, came as a surprise to some exiles 
of the 80s and 90s, who were taken aback by the fact that although civil 
rights and liberties were key elements in the exile community's political 
discourse, the daily practices did not include the right to say something pos-
itive about the Castro government or argue that dialogue and compromise 
could be a way of solving the country's conflict. "It's almost like being back 
in Cuba; if you want to keep your job and friends, you must be careful about 
what you say," stated a married couple of recently exiled Cubans in Miami 
in the 1986. Later interviews, made in 2006, tend to confirm this view, 
although later generations of migrants probably have a better knowledge 
of the Miami community and a more pragmatic and economic approach to 
their situation.4 A key Cuban informant, an employee of a Florida-based 
advocacy organization for immigrants, tells us about his own and other im-
migrants' experiences in this sense. "It's not a dictatorship here [in Florida] , 
4 According to interviews made during visits to Miami in 1986 and 2006. See also Eckstein and Barberia 
(2002) and Perez (2006). 
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but it is difficult to maintain a nuanced idea of today's Cuba without being 
socially excluded," is a common statement. As an increasing number of Cu-
ban exiles tend to emigrate for personal, social , and economic, rather than 
specifically political or ideological reasons, this situation becomes more 
manifest and is experienced by many as a kind of inverted repression. In 
this sense, the two Cubas were not only separated and mutually opposed, 
but they also reflected and even resembled each other in an almost ironic 
way. The dichotomic discourse thus constituted a paradox: the "other" - the 
"bad Cuban" -- is excluded, but constantly present as the necessary opposi-
tion for the construction of a "we." 
There are two incompatible Cuban political and identity discourses , and 
therefore a lack of common ground or "space" for a dialogue between the 
two Cubas (Gustafsson, in print). The fact that this mechanism is being 
slowly and partly undermined by other processes will be argued in the next 
sections, but I also believe that it still has an important function as a dis-
cursive control mechanism, which makes it very difficult to present alter-
native, in-between, or third political projects or even identity discourses . 
An interesting example is the blogger Yoani Sanchez. She is a young Cu-
ban who maintains a blog5 that began as a critical , but not anti-government 
comment on her own daily experiences in the city of Havana. She rapidly 
became quite popular, especially outside Cuba and was awarded important 
prizes in for instance Spain and Denmark. First looked upon as just a young 
Cuban, criticizing aspects of daily life with a sense of humor, she began to 
be considered as a politician and dissident fighting for democracy. At the 
same time, she suffered harassment by the pro-Castro groups or, according 
to herself, the non-uniformed members of the secret police. Recently she 
has become a lot more radical in her criticism and has ended up being the 
dissident that the outside world and the Cuban authorities saw in her. She 
began as one of the many bloggers that potentially could constitute a new 
third space, but ended up as a person and a discourse fitting comfortably 
into one of the two Cubas. These events have taken place within the last 
couple of years and show, in my opinion, that the discursive, symbolic, 
and practical mechanisms of mutual exclusion described above still play an 
important role. 
5 See: hllp://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/ 
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Migration Waves and Transnational Space 
As discussed above, the general tendency of the migration waves from 
Cuba to the U.S. in the 60s and 70s confirmed what I have termed the es-
tablishment of "two Cubas" : a conservative middle- and upper-class Cuban 
community in the U.S., mainly in Miami, opposed to the socialist regime of 
the island (Eckstein and Barberia 2002) . The relations between the island 
and the "Comunidad" (the Cuban community in the U.S.) were almost non-
existent. Therefore, any change in this situation would have to depend on 
a number of factors, including the migration policies of both Cuba and the 
U.S., as well as the character of the Cuban migration waves. 
The first massive "alternative" migration wave to occur was the so-called 
Mariel bridge in 1980, where Fidel Castro turned a threatening political 
crisis-beginning with the occupation of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana 
by various thousands of people seeking asylum-into a victory by uni-
laterally allowing around 125,000 persons to leave the country from the 
Mariel port, some 60 km west of Havana. They would be transported to 
Florida by a maritime bridge made up of thousands of embarkations com-
ing mainly from the coasts of Florida. The official Cuban discourse man-
aged to interpret the situation as a kind of social purification: it was sup-
posed that whoever would leave the country were dissatisfied, anti-social 
and, in many cases, criminal individuals that did not belong to the profound 
revolutionary process that was constructing a national and social utopia. 
They were dismissed as "escoria," that is, "human scum," and they were 
basically considered non-Cubans from the moment they decided to leave 
the country. In this sense, the Mariel migration wave still represented , in 
the official Cuban political discourse, the traditional Cuban dichotomy: the 
emigrants belonged to the decadent capitalist society and not to the revolu-
tionary Cuba. 
However, their arrival and integration in Florida represented something 
different in the case of many of these refugees. While the major migration 
waves of the 1960s and 70s primarily consisted, as mentioned, of middle 
and upper class, mostly white Cubans, the Mariel expatriates were gener-
ally of much more humble social extraction, and the proportion of blacks 
and mulattos was much higher than among the Cubans living in Southern 
Florida (Eckstein and Barberia 2002). Furthermore, these new and different 
exiles were generally uninterested in politics , and their motives for leaving 
Cuba were rather imprecise and sometimes unrealistic ideas of personal 
economic progress or, in some cases, the possibility of escaping prison or 
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punishment for "anti-social behavior" like prostitution , black-market ac-
tivities, or unwillingness to work. In some cases, alleged convicts were 
offered the opportunity of freedom if they chose to leave the country by 
Mariel , and some seemed to have left simply by chance.6 To the Cuban 
community in Florida, the arrival of this new wave of fellow countrymen -
although at first considered a political victory and the I iberation of 125 ,000 
victims from dictatorship - was soon to have an important impact. A rela-
tively homogeneous and dominantly white , middle-class community was 
"enriched" by thousands of fellowmen who were socially, economically, 
racially, and culturally different. According to informants in Miami, class 
and race began to be more visible elements of the community, and while 
earlier migration waves could rely on a rapid integration thanks to the soli-
darity of their compatriots, many "Marielitos" - which was the name given 
to the members of this migration wave-were soon to realize that solidarity 
bad its limits, namely limits related to , for instance, class, social position , 
or race. In this sense, many Marielitos experienced a double rejection: they 
chose to leave Cuba- some even felt forced to do so- yet Miami was not 
for all of them the promised utopia. Some experienced social exclusion 
based on (generally unspoken) racial or social prejudice; others were ex-
cluded on suspicion of being Castro sympathizers, while others simply had 
difficulties finding themselves at home in the receiving country. 
The Mariel wave brought something more: the newcomers-many of 
whom were young-had been socialized in the Revolutionary Cuba of 
the 1960s and 70s, with new cultural and consumer habits as well as new 
ways of thinking and acting. Furthermore, while the first migration waves 
typically consisted of whole and extended families , the Mariel and later 
migration waves more often comprised individuals, couples, or nucleus 
families, for whom family and friends back in Cuba were very impor-
tant (Eckstein and Barberia 2002, interviews held in Miami 2008). To the 
Marielitos, the island was very much a real space with real people, while 
to the first waves of migrants Cuba was becoming a mythical space seen 
as a kind of lost Paradise and contemporary Hell , which most of them had 
very little contact with and very limited knowledge of. So, for a number 
of reasons the "Marielitos" and, even more so, later migration waves, were 
6 In interviews held in Miami 2008 . one informant told me that he had left his house in the morning, got 
drunk and ended up on a boat heading for Key West. Part of his story was confirmed by another informant 
who works in an NGO dedicated to helping refugees and immigrants in Florida. 
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much more inclined to stay in contact with friends and families on the 
island and to develop an actual transnational conscience and feeling of 
belonging. Likewise, they were also more inclined to develop transnational 
economic and other social practices to the (still rather limited) extent this 
was possible. 
So , the Marielitos were more inclined to develop a transnational imagi-
nary and transnational practices, and it should be stressed that this transna-
tionalism is Cuban, in other words, the Marielitos and later migrants would 
see themselves as Cubans in the U.S. rather than Cuban-Americans. The 
members of the first migration waves, and particularly their second and 
subsequent generations, on the other hand, tended to develop a Cuban-
American identity and imaginary, speaking mostly English, and with their 
daily lives and practices completely linked to the U.S. and with almost no 
actual or practical relations to Cuba. Therefore, the Marielito wave consti-
tutes an important step in the construction of a Cuban transnational space 
of social, economic, and symbolic practices. 
Another kind of transnational practice started in the late 1970s, namely 
the visits of expatriate Cubans to their "homeland" .7 These visits were-
and are-limited, dependant as they are on both U.S. and Cuban migra-
tion policies, although the U.S. embargo laws, and especially the so-called 
Helms-Burton Act of 1996 (Eckstein and Barberia 2002: 811-12) constitute 
an overall obstacle to these contacts by the limits it imposes on the fre-
quency and possibility of "home" travels for Cuban-born U.S. citizens.8 
The effect of these visits with regard to the development of a transnational 
imaginary and practices was probably rather small, not only because of the 
limite<l number of visits and their limited economic effect, but also because 
the meetings between "Community Cubans" (members of the Cuban com-
munity in Florida) and their mostly distant families and old friends on the 
island tended to confirm the idea of two Cubas with completely different 
political systems, economies, life styles, and imaginaries. Moreover, a cen-
tral element of such visits was very often the gifts brought by the visitors , 
an element that tended to confirm the idea of members of a rich capitalist 
7 Obviously, "homeland" here is to be understood in a symbolic and mythic sense: the actual homeland of 
most of these Cuban-Americans was , as argued, the U.S .. 
8 Part of the Helms-Burton Act's restrictions were lifted in 2010 by the Obama administration , which made 
travels to Cuba easier and potentially cheaper (allowing charter flights from New York and Los Angeles). 
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community visiting a poor socialist , ancient homeland.9 As already argued 
regarding the Marielitos, essential elements in the development of Cuban 
transnational practices and imaginaries were the later waves of migrants, 
their relation to Cuba, and their motives for emigration. In these cases, 
return visits constitute a very desired and, whenever legally or economi-
cally possible, normal and frequent transnational practice of Cubans living 
abroad and visiting their friends and families. 
While socialist Cuba in the 1980s experienced its probably most stable 
and prosperous period-with the limitations that the term "prosperous" in 
this context must necessarily imply-the period around 1990, with the dis-
mantling of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system, would prove 
disastrous to Cuba's economy and lead to situations of actual starvation 
in the country (Perez-Lopez 2006). As a further consequence, the country 
experienced a new and critical emigration wave from the beginning of the 
1990s (Eckstein and Barberia 2002, Masud-Piloto 2004). This migration 
wave has not stopped, although the intensity of migration fl ows and the 
preferred routes have varied considerably over time. Obviously, migration 
from Cuba to the U.S. has been a constant phenomenon for more than fif-
ty years, but until around 1990, the flow was dominated by major waves, 
as discussed above. However, from the "balseros" wave of the early 90s 
and on the flow has been more constant (Masud-Piloto 2004, Perez 2006, 
Eckstein and Barberia 2002). This means that the tendency toward a more 
transnationally oriented migration flow beginning with Mariel in 1980 has 
been reinforced since the beginning of the 1990s. If Mariel and the Marieli-
tos represented new tendencies in Cuban migration to the U .S. and pointed 
toward new Cuban transnational phenomena, it was still a relatively iso-
lated event. Mariel was indeed very important for the development of the 
Cuban community in the U.S., especially in southern Florida, but it did not 
represent the continued and constant tendency that would begin with the 
migration wave of the early 1990s. 
A first characteristic of this steady migration wave is that it is both le-
gal and illegal (or undocumented10). While legal migration has been rather 
9 These impressions date from the author's years of residence in Cuba, in the mid-80 's, and are based on 
mostly informal conversations, participant observation and similar. See also Eckstein and Barberia 2002. 
10 In this case, I will use one term or the other. The type of migration mentioned is undocumented in the sense 
that these people often travel without passport or other documents and without entrance visa. It is also 
illegal in the sense that Cuban legislation prohibits unauthorized depattures from its territory. The actual 
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steady for more than two decades according to the quotas established by 
mutual agreements (including a lottery system established in 1994), many 
migrants to the U.S. in this period left Cuba and entered into the U.S . with-
out papers and permits. The most important route to be taken in the 1990s 
and during part of the following decade was by sea, crossing the Florida 
Straits in order to reach U.S. territory. In later years, due to a series of 
factors, and particularly increased U.S. reluctance to give asyl.um to the 
"balseros" (Cuban boat-refugees), the number of balseros has decreased, 
and other routes, especially Mexico , have been used for undocumented mi-
gration.11 
A second characteristic is that the later migration flows , both documented 
and undocumented, represent virtually all segments of Cuban society, and 
likewise the motives for leaving the country vary and range from political 
and economic to family reasons. In general, however, the main motive has 
shifted from political to economic (Eckstein and Barberia 2002, interviews 
held in Miami 2008), a phenomenon also acknowledged by Cuban presi-
dent Raul Castro. Furthermore, the political motives often tend to be unspe-
cific and unrelated to fonnalized political or ideological beliefs , more often 
connected to personal sentiments and experiences, and frequently mixed 
with economic reasons. Taken together, such motives would constitute the 
individual's or the family 's set of motives for Leaving Cuba-often in very 
dangerous and insecure circumstances-in order to seek a better life else-
where. The migrants of the 60s and 70s tended to interpret their political 
motives in clear and general terms of belonging to one or the other side in 
Cuban (and global) politics, while the migrants of the later decades seem 
to have a more individual view of politics. Some might see themselves as 
victims of, or opponents to, Cuba's political regime, but this is not neces-
sarily translated into a more global political vision and even less to actual 
participation in a given political project. 
Moreover, rather than taking a political stand, many Cubans-on Cuba 
and in Miami12-tend to deny an interest in politics , an attitude developed 
practices of punishment have vaiied from severe persecution , in some periods, to a cerlain degree of toler-
ance , in others . 
11 According to an interview with the aforementioned member of an immigrants advocacy NGO, the "Mexi-
can route" has become more ilifficu lt and dangerous and has therefore declined , meaning that there is not 
one s ingle preferred route for undocumented Cuban migrants. 
12 According to inte rviews and informal conversations he ld in Miami (2008) and Havana (2006). 
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as a reaction to the way in which the official discourse politicizes almost 
the entire public sphere, and even an important part of the private one (Gus-
tafsson in print). When this attitude is brought to Miami, it contributes to 
the creation of a less politicized and Jess dichotomized transnational space 
hetween the two Cubas. 
A third characteristic is that this latest and rather permanent flow of mi-
grants to the U.S. consists mostly of persons born after 1959, and almost 
exclusively of persons with no or virtually no personal memory of the pre-
revolutionary period. Since the early 90s, the absolute majority of the mi-
grants have had revolutionary Cuba as their main, and most often only, life-
world and horizon of experience. In most cases they have close relatives 
and friends on the island and wil1 tend to maintain relations of all kinds with' 
them, even if legal or economic problems make return visits difficult. 
The characteristics mentioned point toward a gradual creation of a trans-
national space between the two Cubas much more similar to the ones seen 
in cases like Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and other Latin American 
countries. Likewise, the dichotomized situation of two completely opposed 
spaces with very little contact seems to be weakening. The significance 
of this process, however, should not be exaggerated: motives of politics, 
economy, and tradition as well as the weight of the first wave migrants 
still constitute important impediments for the fuJJ development of such a 
transnational space. The U.S. embargo against Cuba and Cuban migration 
policies are obviously major elements in this context. Another equaJJy im-
portant factor is the role of the economy and in particular the remittances 
from the U.S. to Cuba. 
Economic Changes and the "Dollarization" of Cuban Economy in the 
1990s 
For years, Cuba, like other socialist systems, has had a double currency 
system consisting of a convertible and a non-convertible currency. The 
convertible currency- besides its use in international transactions - con-
stituted a kind of economic "island" within the island, as it was the cur-
rency used in the so-called "diplotiendas," other stores, and supermarkets 
offering products normally not available to the ordinary Cubans. Also some 
hotels and tourist installations introduced a number of products intended 
for households rather than tourists. Formally, these products and services, 
consisting of clothes, shoes, electronic equipment, and, to some extent, also 
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food, were designed for tourism and foreign residents , but in practice they 
became, in the 80s, an important secondary source of consumption for ordi-
nary Cubans as well as a source of foreign currency revenues for the Cuban 
government and its enterprises . Until 1993 ordinary Cubans were generally 
not allowed to possess (and less , to spend) foreign currency-exceptions 
could be Cubans working in foreign enterprises or whose work implied 
traveling. Therefore, a complex system of illegal and semi-legal econom-
ic transactions and practices developed so that these products -which in 
quantity and characteristics would exceed the needs of both tourists and the 
relatively few foreign residents - could be distributed to Cuban homes. A 
black currency market was a cornerstone of this complex web of economic 
transactions and multiple popular practices in which foreign residents, in-
cluding the "tecnicos" (i.e. "technicians," which was the common denomi-
nator) from the socialist camp played an important role .13 
These economic practices had an obvious transnational dimension as 
they implied the use of foreign currency, but also because these webs of dis-
tribution required the assistance of tourists and resident foreigners in order 
to function. Even if they possessed foreign currency, ordinary Cubans could 
not buy in these stores, and even to enter one would immediately cause a 
reaction from the ever present security guard. The paradox was evident and 
well known, and the very existence of this market of specialized and privi-
leged stores with their desired products tended to enhance a transnational 
economic imaginary. The acquisition of blue jeans, leather shoes, refrigera-
tors, stereos, wine, and many other products, also some more basic ones, 
was a privilege limited to foreigners , and only accessible to Cubans through 
sacrifice and risk. Yet, at the same time, an actual function of this market 
was to distribute daily and durable goods to ordinary Cuban households. 
A common expression in the 1980s and 1990s was "area d6lar" ("dollar 
area"), which meant that a given space, e.g. a store, restaurant, or hotel was 
only accessible to people legally in possession of foreign currency (mainly 
U.S. dollars) and, thus , not for common Cubans, for whom this "area" be-
came a symbol of desire and consumption. But this particular transnational 
economic and symbolic space did not, at that moment, connect the two 
Cubas significantly. Frequently, of course, the clients of these stores were 
"community Cubans" from Florida who bought products for their fami-
13 As a foreign resident in Cuba during four years (1983-87), the author became well acquainted with these 
practices. 
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lies and friends, but due to the limited number of visits and the relatively 
scarce contact between the two communities, the existence of specialized 
foreign currency shops did not have a major impact on the creation of a 
transnational Cuban space between Miami and the island. In later years, 
however, this space has become more Cuban-transnational , due to visits by 
later generations of emigrants. 
This market, on the other hand, implied a number of difficulties of both 
a moral and economic nature, especially due to the extended black market 
of U.S. currency beyond the control of the official economic channels. To 
attack these and other problems, especially the acute economic crisis and 
"years of hunger" of the early 1990s, the Cuban government decided in 
1993 to legalize; the tenancy and use of foreign cunency, in practice U.S. · 
dollars (Rowe and Yanes Faya 2004,Mesa-Lago 2004). The U.S. dollar and 
other foreign currencies, however, ceased to function as legal means of pay-
ment in 2004, being substituted by the CUC, the convertible Cuban Peso. 
This measure permitted the Cuban government to exercise a closer control 
over the currency market and to receive an additional tax on currency ex-
change (Naranjo Orovio 2009). In any case, the legalization and general use 
of convertible cmTency can be seen as an important step in a slow and con-
tradictory process of economic reforms and performance (Ritter 2004) that 
may still today, in 2011, be considered embryonic, although much more de-
veloped. In the context studied here, the general legalization of foreign cur-
rency possession and use opened up for a much more developed economic 
transnational space as the sending and receiving of economic remittances 
became common practice. It is important to stress that this new economic 
legislation coincided with the new migration wave of the early 90s, during 
the "special period" and years of crisis (Masud-Piloto 2004). Therefore , 
two significant factors coincided in the creation of a more extended and de-
veloped transnational space between the island and the Cuban community 
in the U.S .. One was the new economic space created by the legalization 
of the dollar, and the other a new and rather constant wave of migration 
of people much more inclined to maintain relations, economic and others, 
with the home country. 
In conclusion , the specific character of the Cuban economic model, in-
cluding the double currency system, has been an important impediment for 
the development of a transnational space. Informal economic practices cre-
ated small , illegal " islands" of alternative spaces, but not until the economic 
reforms and new migration practices of the 90s did the potential for a more 
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general economic transnational space become a reality. The opening up of 
such space(s) is, Logically, pa1t of a much broader process of cultural and 
mental transformations and therefore a discussion of recent changes in what 
I term the "social imaginary" in Cuba is relevant. 
Politicization and De-politicization of the Social Imaginary and the 
Private Space 
The public space, and a great part of the private space in Cuba, is highly 
politicized in the sense that it is permeated by explicit and implicit politi-
cal discourse . Public space, in this context, means the media, work places, 
institutions of all kinds as well as cultural events like concerts , cinema, etc., 
and, of course, the streets and open public space. All these spaces are per-
meated, to some extent, by an explicit political discourse from the govern-
ment, the Communist Party, and other official institutions. By explicit po-
litical discourse I refer to ideological and political messages of all kinds, 
while implicit political discourse is an even more generalized phenomenon 
permeating even language use as such, for instance in the generalization of 
the idea that any process is a "struggle." 14 The media , especially television , 
logically constitute an important passage way between the public and the 
private sphere, but the mass organizations like the CDR (Committees for 
the Defense of the Revolution), the FMC (Cuban Women's Federation), the 
"Pioneros" (the School Pupils' Organization), and others have played and 
to some extent still play an essential role in controlling and integrating the 
common citizen in the revolutionary project. 
The consequence is that , on the one hand, the official political discourse 
is present anywhere, anyhow, and constantly without actual competition 
(Gustafsson, in print). On the other hand, it means that this discourse to 
some point has managed to identify itself with "politics" as such. In other 
words, Cubans born and brought up after 1959 have become accustomed to 
understanding the term "politics" as the official political propaganda rather 
than a contested space of mutually opposed, conflictive, or competing dis-
courses . A further consequence of this discursive monopoly is often that 
people in their weariness or rejection of such particular discourse tend to re-
14 An example could be the way any minor problem of economic or technical character is referred to as a 
"struggle," as the "struggle for the quality of the bread" (heard in November 2006 in a Cuban television 
program with local news). 
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ject "politics" as such, including the sole idea of defining a poli tical identity 
for themselves or opting for one or another political position or discourse. 
This does not mean that politics cannot return and rapidly become one of 
the most meaningful elements of the social imaginary, but for years many 
Cubans have seemed to prefer to concentrate on more immediate questions, 
like the solution of practical, individual, or family problems, such as hous-
ing, day-to-day consumption, etc . (Moreno 2004). 
In a certain sense, such a tendency also seems to exist in the Cuban com-
munity in the U.S. First, because this community in some way works as a 
sometimes inverted reflection of the island , the constant presence of an anti-
Castro discourse and its hitherto limited effects on Cuba (although often 
influential in U.S . politics) can lead to a sense of tiredness among younger; 
especially second or third generations of Cubans or Cuban-Americans in 
the U.S. Another element is the later migration waves discussed above. For 
many of these Cubans, the fall of the revolutionary government might be (or 
not be) desirable, but for many others, or most of them, it is not something 
necessarily considered a central or realistic issue. As discussed, a main mo-
tive for a majority of these migrants, especially since the 1990s, is not poli-
tics or political repression as such , but rather a general dissatisfaction with 
life and its circumstances on Cuba, and especially its economic and social 
dimensions. Although many of these more recent Cuban immigrants might 
be inclined to accept a different political discourse than the one they are 
used to and brought up with , it is likely that their main preoccupations will 
be with their family, work, housing, children , education, pension, etc., rather 
than the political perspectives and a final solution of Cuba's problems. 
This can mean, on one hand, that there are conditions for the develop-
ment of a more de-politicized transnational Cuban space dominated by eco-
nomic, social, and cultural remittances that go both ways . Such a space, 
however, has not been, until now, an important element in the develop-
ment of alternative political spaces, discourses, and projects that could help 
to dissolve the political and discursive dichotomy between the island and 
Miami. Rather, it seems that while the elites in Miami and Havana, to put 
it simply, maintain a relatively traditional political discourse within their 
respective spaces of dominance, alternative political voices, such as the 
dissidents and some "blogueros" ("bloggers") in Cuba, like the aforemen-
tioned Yoani Sanchez, are relatively isolated from the general public's wor-
ries. This should of course not imply that "ordinary Cubans" are indifferent 
to themes like "democracy," "human rights," and the country 's political 
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system. But such and other specific political issues are, for a number of 
reasons, out of reach, and less relevant to a majority of non-elite Cubans 
than econom.ic issues related to the solution of a household's day-to-day 
and long-term problems. And when it is claimed that dissidents, blogueros, 
and other elements of opposition receive lim.ited attention from a majority 
of Cubans , it should also be stressed that these actors do play an impor-
tant role on other levels, constituting an important element of international 
pressure on the Cuban government. Likewise , what today seems to be an 
attitude of political apathy-or, more accurate I y, an attitude of conscious 
de-politicization-might change rapidly and radically when circumstances 
change . 
Recent Reforms and Raul's Pragmatism 
The process of economic reforms that have begun under the government 
of Raul Castro- who took over presidential functions in 2006, due to Fidel 
Castro's illness, and was elected president in 2008-seems to have two, 
closely connected, major objectives , one econom.ic and the other political. 
One corresponds to the desire and necessity of a general re-structuring of 
the economk model, which has been suffering from a series of inherent dif-
ficulties and often modeled according to ideological , rather than econom.ic 
criteria (Mesa-Lago 2004), and the population's needs. The new model is 
aimed at being more adequate under the current global circumstances but 
also capable of maintaining a certain national sovereignty, as well as de-
signed to begin to meet the desires and necessities of the Cuban popula-
tion. These goals lead to the second major objective, which is to secure the 
economic base for a process of change and adaptation which in the official 
discourse is not termed "transition" -actually the term has been banned 
explicitly - but rather "actualization" and similar terms to indicate that the 
process is not a rupture. However, there is no doubt that due to a number 
of factors, including Cuba's own political , economic, and social dynamics, 
international circumstances and, not least, the age of the maximum leaders 
of a very centralized and personalized power, the current political and eco-
nomic process will inevitably lead to a series of important changes that will 
modify the Cuban system radically, although it is still difficult to predict 
how radical this process will be. Minor measures, introduced mainly during 
2009 and 2010, have been to "liberate" (i.e . allow for the general public) the 
sale and purchase of a number of products, including cellphones. Although 
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such products without doubt are important to a number of Cubans, the most 
important effect of these measures was probably symbolic: they showed 
that the government was beginning to worry about something that always 
seemed to be postponed in order to safeguard the Revolution 's needs, that 
is, ordinary people's consumption needs and desires. Another measure has 
been to modify the legislation that regulates the selling and buying of real 
estate properties. 
Supposedly, by the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012, a complete 
"liberation" of the property market will take place. The most drastic step 
until now, however, has been the decision to dismiss one million public em-
ployees, most of whom are supposed to find their future living by establish-
ing small businesses of their own. At the same time, the conditions for small 
enterprises are revised in order to secure better conditions, but also more 
consistent taxation rules. These measures will inevitably change the Cuban 
society's economic structures and performance in many ways, for instance 
by further opening up to transnational economic and social spaces . 
As indicated, from 2010 the Cuban government has engaged in impor-
tant economic reforms, including the mentioned reduction of a great num-
ber of state-employed workers and the correspondent increase of (private) 
micro-enterprises. Although many Cubans have expressed for years that an 
opening up for private initiative could be part of a solution of the country's 
economic problems, it is also a fact that most Cubans on the island- in-
cluding, probably, a majority of the "released" state workers- lack both the 
entrepreneurial knowledge and financial resources required for most such 
enterprises. However, such resources are available in the Cuban communi-
ties in the U.S. A number of factors, some of which have been discussed 
above, put obvious limilaliuns uu exile Cubans' participation in small enter-
prises on the island , and we can hardly expect to see a development of 
major transnational joint ventures between the two Cubas before important 
changes in the Cuban-U.S. relations occur, including legislation and atti-
tudes. The U.S. embargo against Cuba is of course the most important sin-
gle element in relation to this problem. If a macro-economic transnational 
Cuban space still seems distant, a considerable potential could nevertheless 
be opening up at the micro level. While the traditional Cuban and Cuban-
American society of the first exile waves and their descendants probably 
will have very limited , if any, interest in investing in micro-enterprises on 
the island , later generations, especially those of the last two decades, could 
find such an option very interesting. 
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As discussed above , many of these emigrants maintain rather close rela-
tions with families and friends on the island, including a constant flow of 
communication by phone or mail as well as the sending of remittances . 
These remittances are spent normally on consumption goods , but the per-
spective of investing some of these resources in small enterprises might 
seem attractive , first as a way of ensuring a more constant financial resource 
for the relatives living on the island and, second, as a possible financial 
source in case their personal situation and the general circumstances should 
favor a return to Cuba. A rapidly growing number of "Marielitos" and later 
generations of Cubans in the U.S. are approaching retirement, and for per-
sonal and cultural as well as economic motives, a number of these people 
consider finding their home for their third age outside the U.S. An economi-
cally reformed and less ideological Cuba could be an option , depending on 
the continuity and success of the current process . There seems also to be 
a growing interest among emigrated Cubans in acquiring properties on the 
island, which is not legally possible at the moment, but could be with the 
liberalization of the real estate market. 
It is not the first time that economic reforms suggesting a more liberal 
understanding of the socialist model have been introduced. The first law 
that allowed selling or buying one's own house or apartment was introduced 
already in the 1980s . Other examples are the free peasant's markets of the 
1980s and 1990s and, of course, the already mentioned liberalization of 
foreign currency in 1993 (Mesa-Lago 2004, Rowe and Yanes Faya 2004). 
However, before the Raul Castro administration, such measures were often 
introduced reluctantly, and they were frequently modified or simply with-
drawn, allegedly because they were inefficient or, in some cases, because 
they gave unjust benefits to a limited number of persons, or promoted capi-
talist mentality and the like: in other words, because they were too efficient. 
The current reform process has been much more radical than any other 
since the 1970s, and it is presented openly as a renewal or reform of the 
"model," rather than as isolated measures. For the first time in decades , the 
official discourse does not picture the reforms as circumstantial and specific 
measures necessary to secure economically or ideologically defined goals , 
as generally would have been the case under Fidel Castro. On the contrary, 
the reforms are the goals, although still presented as reforms aimed at en-
suring a more contemporary and dynamic version of the Cuban socialism. 
Until recently, the ultimate measure of what was "good" and "bad," accept-
able or not, would mainly be ideological, and the arguments used in the 
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offic ial di scourse's interpellation of its citizens would be ideological and 
political. Although still timid, there now seems to be a tendency in official 
discourse to value more pragmatic elements, including daily needs and de-
sires of ordinary people. 
This acceptance of political, economic, and ideological pragmatism 
could indicate a further willingness of Raul Castro's administration to per-
mit other imaginaries and discourses than the traditional, and since 1959 
dominant, national-revolutionary ideology without accepting, however, a 
political pluralism that might threaten the regime 's survival. Another sign 
in this direction is the changed attitude toward some non-official actors of 
Cuban society, particularly the religious institutions, including the Catholic 
and Russian-Orthodox Churches and the Jewish society, which have re-
cently, in one way or another, been granted a certain official status and re-
cognition . Formerly, these institutions were allowed in principle, but barely 
tolerated in practice. Probably, the most important step in this direction has 
been to accept members of the Catholic hierarchy as formal and influential 
partners in the question of the liberation of political prisoners .15 Such a step 
would have been difficult to imagine only a short time ago. Furthermore, to 
underline the Cuban State's reconciliation with the country's different reli-
gious manifestations, Raul Castro underlined in his speech at the end of the 
National Assembly's gathering in August 2011 that exclusion for religious 
motives is an obsolete and completely unacceptable practice. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Cuban rhetoric toward the U.S. 
has changed during the presidency of Raul Castro, whose own discourse on 
Cuban-American relations tends to be more moderate and conciliatory than 
Fidel Castro's. Although this does not necessarily imply a completely new 
turn in foreign policy- formally, the revolutionary Cuba's policy toward 
the U.S . has been based on the idea of mutual respect and recognition , but 
actually dominated by a hostile discourse toward the U.S. - it would seem 
to indicate an important change of discourse and rhetoric. Eventually, such 
a change could imply that the official discourse on Cuban-U .S . relations 
and relations between the " two Cubas" would put less stress on contradic-
tions and hostility and begin to emphasize the existence and even positive 
values of a transnational space of "cubanness," consisting of economic, 
cultural , and - maybe-even political relations. 
J 5 Jn early July 2010, the process of liberating 75 political prisoners was initiated after a period of negotia-
tions with representatives of the Catholic Church of Cuba. 
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To sum up, I propose that the current situation of reforms and relatively 
radical changes, mostly in the Cuban economy and to some extent also in 
the political and general social spheres , may very well become an impor-
tant-and even decisive-factor in the development of a transnational Cu-
ban space. Due to the slow, contradictory, and still relatively recent charac-
ter of the reform process , it is difficult to predict its consequences; however, 
it is a fact that certain official practices and discourses tend to move away 
from the highly ideological and politicized visions and statements typical 
of the dichotomi zed image of the two Cubas and toward a much more prag-
matic version of the national political identity, which could eventually im-
ply an opening toward a more transnational understanding of the country. 
Conclusion- Transition and Transnationalism 
The relative absence of official diplomatic, political, and economic rela-
tions between the U.S. and Cuba for about five decades has sometimes led 
to the assumption that Cuba and Cubans are generally isolated from the 
U.S., which is only a partial trnth that obscures another and very important 
fact , namely that there is a growing transnational space of economic, social, 
and other types of relations between the two countries, and particularly be-
tween Cubans in the U.S. and Cuba. As discussed , the history of relations 
between the two countries has been that of a complex web of transnational 
connections beginning in the 19th century, when Cuba was still a Spanish 
colony. The intensity and character of these relations have developed and 
changed in the course of history, but all major political events in Cuba's his-
tory as a nation - beginning with its early formation and independence-
have been rather closely linked to the U.S., and indeed more closely than 
any other foreign country. 
It is true that the revolution of 1959 and its subsequent consequenc-
es- especially the U.S. embargo (or blockade, in the Cuban terminology) 
against Cuba and the creation of an exile community opposed to, and iso-
lated from, the island-implied the most radical and profound change of 
these relations. But a consequence was also that the Cuban community in 
the U.S. became more numerous, permanent and powerful than ever before, 
thus confirming in a new sense the historical importance of transnational 
Cuban-U.S. relations. Although the Mariel events of 1980 marked a turning 
point in the development of the post-revolutionary transnational space, due 
to the age and social and racial composition of these emigres, it was not 
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until the early 1990s that the actual and probable effects of these new trends 
would become manifest. With regards to the objective of this article-to 
demonstrate the tendency toward the constitution of a transnational Cuban 
and Cuban-U.S. space- the most important effect of the later migration 
waves was the initial development of a transnational space less dominated 
by political contradictions and dichotomic discourse, and more similar to 
those of other Caribbean and Central American countries (and Mexico) . 
Besides the character of the later migration waves, other important con-
tributing factors have been a series of economic reforms in Cuba and the 
gradual change of mentality-or social imaginary- among Cubans inside 
and outside the national territory. 
Certain developments in recent years and the current period seem to con- · 
fi rm such tendencies: first, the steady growth of a community of Cuban-
born immigrants who maintain close relations to family and friends on the 
island and are less worried about politics and ideology than about their own 
and their relatives' social and economic situation; second, the-at least ap-
parent- tendency in Raul Castro's government toward a less ideological 
and more pragmatic attitude to economic and, to some extent, social and 
political questions; third , the process of economic reforms initiated by this 
government and, particularly, its decision to dismiss half a million state-
employed workers in order to create a private sector of micro-enterprises 
for these and other Cubans. The coincidence of a growing community of 
Cubans who have migrated to the U.S. for economic reasons and a growing 
space for private initiative and enterprise in Cuba can be a decisive factor 
in the development of a broader transnational space between Cuba and the 
U.S ., and especially between the two Cubas. 
On the other hand , important factors remain that work against such ten-
dencies: first , the U.S. embargo and the legal , formal, and practical obstacles 
to Cuban-U.S. relations; second , the traditional and very conservative Cu-
ban elite in the U.S ., especially in southern Florida, who , together with 
important fractions of the U.S . political establishment (especially in the 
Republican Party) oppose any contact with, or opening toward , the "Castro 
regime"; third, the difficulties that may result from the Cuban authorities' 
policy toward exile Cubans' engagement in small private enterprises on 
the island. Such policies have not been defined , but high taxation and bu-
reaucratic obstacles could be possible difficulties. These three factors , and 
especially the first two at present, constitute some of the major challenges 
for a transnational socio-economic space that could benefit Cubans on both 
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sides of the Flmida Strait and potentially conttibute to a peaceful transition 
in Cuba (without necessarily defining the end-goal of such a transition). 
Three other factors, however, could indicate a potential reduction of these 
impediments: first, the Obama administration has shown a more pragmatic 
attitude toward Cuba and its government than most former administrations; 
second, the traditional Cuban elite in Miami has lost some of its political 
monopoly-not only are some Cubans now voting for the Democrats , but 
many members of the more recent migration waves as well as some second 
or third generation Cuban-Americans are beginning to consider the Cuban-
American National Foundation and other traditional elite organizations as 
too ideological and almost obsolete organizations that have lost contact 
with the common Cuban and thus will never fulfill their original objec-
tive, i.e. to "free Cuba from Castro and communism"; third, the political 
and ideological pragmatism shown by the current Cuban government might 
very well lead it to take pragmatic decisions also in relation to small-scale 
financial operations with participation of exile Cubans. 
It has been demonstrated that the existence of a transnational space of 
economic, political, and cultural-symbolic relations between Cuba and the 
U.S. and in particular between Cubans in the United States and on the is-
land, has played an important role in all major transformation processes in 
Cuba's history. I have also suggested that a transnational space might be of 
importance in the current process to transform Cuban society. Due to the 
obstacles discussed, the transnational space remains limited in its extension 
and effects, but there is an important perspective for a growing interdepen-
dence between national and transnational processes in the case of Cuba. 
Such a perspective could also imply a transition toward an economically, 
culturally, and politically more pluralistic Cuba. However, this would re-
quire and imply the gradual creation of a "third space," as discussed above, 
that is a national and transnational space for economic , political, and cultur-
al-symbolic dynamics not dominated by the current Cuban government and 
the PCC (the Cuban Communist Party) , nor by the traditional conservative 
elite of Miami. 
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